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ON THE ORIGINS OF ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION
Robert A. McLeman *
In recent years, policymakers and the media have paid increasing
attention to the subject of environmentally-related human migration.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the Stern
Report on Climate Change, the Global Environmental Outlook and
similar studies have all expressed concern that environmental
degradation and resource depletion, exacerbated by the impacts of
anthropogenic climate change, may lead to wide-scale displacements
of human populations around the globe. I  Notwithstanding the
growing discussion of this subject, scientific understanding of the
relationship between the environment and migration is still very
much in a developmental stage.
The present article reviews how environmental factors, changes
and events (particularly those linked to anthropogenic climate
change) influence migration decisions and behavior. The focus is on
migration decision-making at the household level, for it is here that
most migration decisions are typically made.2 There are examples of
state-initiated relocations of populations in response to environmental
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1. NEIL ADGER ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION
AND VULNERABILITY 9 (M. L. Parry et al. eds., 2007); NICHOLAS STERN, THE
STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, at iv (2007); UNITED
NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL OUTLOOK 4:
ENVIRONMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT 86-87, 209-10 (4th ed. 2007).
2. See R. McLeman & B. Smit, Migration as an Adaptation to Climate
Change, 76 CLIMATIC CHANGE 31, 31-53 (2006).
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factors, but these are small in proportion to the broader scale of
global migration.3  By understanding the context in which
environmental migration originates, it is possible to better gauge the
reliability of future scenarios, which project climate change to
become a driver of millions of environmental migrants/refugees in
coming decades. 4 It is particularly hoped that this article will be of
assistance to legal scholars, who are becoming increasingly engaged
in issues related to the protection of environmentally displaced
persons, eco-migration, and environmental refugees, as well as in the
creation of programs and policies to build adaptive capacity in
developing regions and in creating institutional frameworks for
mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
I. THE SPECTRUM OF ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES ON HUMAN
MIGRATION
There is a wide spectrum of interactions between humans and the
environment that can potentially influence migration decisions and
behavior, a spectrum that is heavily influenced by the nature of the
environmental conditions, events or changes in question; the time-
scale over which these conditions emerge or occur; and, the time-
scale over which migration responses occur.5 Some environmental
conditions can be beneficial to human livelihoods and well-being,
and thereby be seen as a positive attraction for migrants to particular
locales; other environmental conditions can have adverse impacts on
livelihoods and well-being, and thereby act as stimuli for people to
leave, or in the worst cases, flee particular locales.6 There are many
3. See id. at 37.
4. For some recent examples of such forecasts, see Norman Myers,
Environmental Refugees: A Growing Phenomenon of the 21st Century, 357 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOC'Y BIOLOGICAL Sci. 609, 612 (2002);
CHRISTIAN AID, HUMAN TIDE: THE REAL MIGRATION CRISIS (2007). For an earlier
review of such forecasts, see Robert McLeman, Climate Change Migration,
Refugee Protection and Adaptive Capacity-Building, 4 MCGILL INT'L J. OF
SUSTAINABLE DEV. LAW AND POLICY 1, 4 (2008).
5. See McLeman & Smit, supra note 2, at 32-33.
6. Influences on human migration decisions have often been cast in terms of
"push" and "pull" factors following the model described in Everett S. Lee, A
Theory of Migration, 3 DEMOGRAPHY 47, 49-54 (1966). While the discussion that
follows is consistent with push-pull logic, it is considerably enhanced and
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time-scales over which changes in environmental conditions and
events occur. Conditions known to influence human migration can
occur suddenly (e.g. earthquakes, tsunami, volcanic eruptions,
tornadoes, flash floods) or may take years to emerge or accumulate
and become fully recognized (e.g. drought, soil erosion, forest loss). 7
Human responses to such changes also occur across various time-
scales, and may be initiated in anticipation of or in response to,
environmental stresses. 8  Within this context, environmental
migration may be undertaken on a temporary basis (as an ad hoc
response or as a systematically repeated one such as seasonal labor
migration); in the form of a long-term circular pattern of movement
(such as where individuals migrate for part or all of their working
lives but retire to the place of their childhood); or on an indefinite
basis, with migrants never returning to their place of former
residence.
9
This spectrum of environmental outcomes is illustrated in Figure 1,
in which duration of the migration event is represented on the
horizontal axis and the nature of the environmental stimulus is on the
vertical axis. The four quadrants that are created represent four
possible types or outcomes of environmental migration, with an
example named for each. The two quadrants above the vertical axis
reflect the potential migration outcomes where environmental
conditions are beneficial or attractive to human population growth.
The upper right-hand quadrant describes migration undertaken on a
permanent basis to take advantage of favorable environmental
conditions. As an example, in recent years, the fastest growing
populations in the U.S. have been the Sun-belt states. 10 Much of this
growth is fuelled by migration from elsewhere, and among those
expanded. See generally McLeman & Smit, supra note 2 (providing a detailed
review of migration theory as it applies to environment-related migration).
7. See McLeman, supra note 4, at 7.
8. See id. at 4-5.
9. See Myers, supra note 4, at 609-10.
10. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CUMULATIVE ESTIMATES OF POPULATION CHANGE
FOR THE UNITED STATES, REGIONS, STATES, AND PUERTO RICO AND REGION AND
STATE RANKINGS: APRIL 1, 2000 TO JULY 1, 2008, 1-2, available at
http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-pop-chg.html. The 2008 U.S. Census
show the five states with the highest population increase in absolute numbers from
2000-2008 are, in order, Texas, California, Florida, Georgia and Arizona. Together
these states have grown by almost 12 million people this decade, a figure roughly
equal to the entire population of the state of Ohio. Id.
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migrants are many retired and semi-retired former residents of the
northeastern and midwestern states attracted by the year-round mild
climate. Each winter, they are joined by many more "snowbirds";
that is, people who maintain their nominal permanent residences in
more northerly states or in Canada, but who spend the winter months
each year in the south or southwest. This latter group is captured in
the upper left-hand quadrant.
Figure 1: Four categories of environmental migration
Example: Snowbirds
Temporary csplacementtretocation
Example: Hurricane Katrina
Example: Sun-belt migration
tnrdefinite Maration
I U
Example: Dust Bowl migration
C
U
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The lower half of Figure 1 captures the opposite side of the
environmental impact spectrum, where environmental conditions (or
changes in those conditions) have negative or potentially negative
effects on livelihoods and well-being."' The lower left-hand quadrant
11. This article was composed in relation to the Fordham Environmental Law
Review's symposium, Global Responses to Eco-Migration and Environmental
Disasters: The Role of U.S. and International Law and Policy. The symposium was
concerned primarily with questions pertaining to migration that occurs under
adverse environmental conditions, and so the remainder of this article and the
examples used will focus principally on the lower quadrants of Figure 1. Although
American examples have deliberately been selected to illustrate Figure l's
categorization of environmentally related migration, many more examples from
each category could easily be identified on all continents inhabited by humans.
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describes short-term or temporary migration in response to adverse
environmental conditions. Flight from natural disasters falls clearly
within this quadrant, and would include such examples as
evacuations that have been carried out in recent years in the face of
hurricanes and tropical storms along the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico
coasts and in response to dryland fires in California. The lower right
quadrant describes long-term or indefinite migration of households
away from regions of adverse environmental conditions. The best-
known and likely the largest of these in U.S. history is the 1930s Dust
Bowl migration, when a period of persistent drought conditions
combined with economic hardship of the Depression years to lead
hundreds of thousands of Americans to leave the Great Plains
states. 12
An important observation to be made is that these categories of
migration are not mutually exclusive. A single environmental event
or condition can lead to multiple migration outcomes. Hurricane
Katrina, for example, led to a large-scale evacuation of much of the
population of New Orleans and surrounding Gulf Coast
communities. 13 After the storm hit and the city's flood defenses
failed, many more who had remained behind (through choice or lack
of transportation) needed to be relocated. In the years that have since
followed, the city has regained about two-thirds of its former
population (Figure 2). 14 It is doubtful that all those who live in New
Orleans today were residents prior to Katrina. It may well be that the
post-hurricane reconstruction has attracted new workers to New
Orleans, and so the number of people who have not returned since
Katrina might actually be greater than the census data would suggest.
A point to be observed here is that post-Katrina migration patterns
12. See JAMES N. GREGORY, AMERICAN EXODUS: THE DUST BOWL MIGRATION
AND OKIE CULTURE IN CALIFORNIA, at xiii-xiv (1989); Myron P. Gutmann et al.,
Two Population-Environment Regimes in the Great Plains of the United States,
1930-1990, 27 POPULATION & ENV'T 191, 192, 199, 218 (2005). See generally
Robert McLeman, Migration Out Of 1930s Rural Eastern Oklahoma: Insights for
Climate Change Research, 26 GREAT PLAINS Q. 27 (2006).
13. See Joseph B. Treaster & Abby Goodnough, Powerful Storm Threatens
Havoc Along Gulf Coast, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2005, at Al.
14. See U.S. Census Bureau, City Population Datasets (2008), available at
http://www.census.gov/popest/counties/files/CO-EST2008-POPCHG2000_2008-
22.csv
20091
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around New Orleans likely sprawl across both left-hand quadrants of
Figure 1, and possibly across all four quadrants to some extent.
Figure 2: Population, Orleans Parish, LA 15
Figure 2: Population, Orleans Parish LA
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Figure 1 categorizes environmentally related population
movements, but offers no information in terms of causation. In the
example of the 1930s Dust Bowl migration, chosen to illustrate the
upper left quadrant, while hundreds of thousands of Americans fled
the drought-stricken Great Plains, many more did not. Migration was
not the only means by which people responded to the droughts of
those years. 16 Similarly, while many Americans today elect to retire
to the Sun-belt states, they represent but a fraction of America's ever-
aging population. It is also notable that in many of America's Sun-
belt states, such as Arizona, Nevada, and the Gulf Coast states, rapid
population growth is a relatively recent phenomenon. For much of
the post-Civil War era, American population growth was
concentrated in the midwest, northeast, Texas and California. The
"Great Migration" period of the first half of the twentieth century saw
millions migrate out of the rural south for economic opportunities in
the urban centers to the north. 17 Clearly then, it is important to
15. Id.
16. See Robert McLeman et al., Drought Adaptation in Rural Eastern
Oklahoma in the 1930s: Lessons for Climate Change Adaptation Research, 13
MITIGATION & ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 379, 387-92 (2008)
(detailing the rural adaptation strategies in the1930s).
17. See Stewart E. Tolnay et al., Distances Traveled During the Great
Migration: An Analysis of Racial Differences Among Male Migrants, 29 SOC. SCI.
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remain aware that the environment-migration relationships shown in
Figure 1 are necessarily nested within the much larger, broader set of
social, economic, and cultural processes at work in society that also
influence migration behavior.
II. THE REASONS BEHIND ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION
Trying to uncover the reasons behind environmental migrations
raises many challenging questions. For example, droughts are a
recurrent phenomenon on North America's Great Plains; rarely does
the period of a decade or two pass without a period where
precipitation declines sharply causing significant financial losses in
the regions agricultural sector.18 Yet why is it that some droughts
have led to widespread migration while others have not? Why did
hundreds of thousands flee the Great Plains during the 1930s, while
equally severe droughts in the 1970s and late 1990s had less
influence on migration patterns? Research has shown that the 1930s
migration was not a random exodus of drought-stricken farmers, but
that out-migrants disproportionately constituted young families
drawn from particular socio-economic classes.' 9 Why is it then that
particular groups fled the droughts while other social groups stayed
on? What distinguishes migrants from non-migrants in such
situations?
The Katrina example raises still more challenging questions.
While 150,000 people have not returned to New Orleans, it is in some
ways remarkable that so many more did return (or move there from
elsewhere), for that city is just as vulnerable today to hurricanes as it
was in 2005. And it is inevitable that another hurricane will strike
New Orleans, it is only a question of when. Why is it that some
HIST. 523, 523 (2005). Although the term "Great Migration" is often applied to the
movement of African-Americans out of the South, this era saw the migration of
rural poor of many racial origins migrating along similar patterns. See id. at. 523-
524.
18. See David J. Sauchyn et al., A Paleoclimatic Context for the Drought of
1999-2001 in the Northern Great Plains of North America, 169 GEOGRAPHICAL J.
158, 158, 161-63 (2003). In fact, researchers have suggested that the twentieth
century was likely a wetter-than-average period on the Great Plains as compared
with the long-term climatological record. See id.
19. See sources cited supra note 12.
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people leave and never return, while others immediately begin
rebuilding in the same place as soon as possible?
In more general terms, these examples show that environmental
conditions sometimes influence human migration patterns but at other
times do not, and that a single environmental event can produce very
complicated migration patterns. Environmental migration is clearly
therefore not a simple cause-effect, stimulus-response type of
phenomenon. To understand it and its inherent complexities requires
an appreciation of the biological, chemical, geological and physical
processes that shape environmental conditions AND an
understanding of social, economic, cultural and similar systems and
processes that shape human society and human behavior.
III. ENVIRONMENTAL STIMULI FOR HUMAN MIGRATION
The types of environmental forces that are most commonly
associated with human migration fall into two general categories:
sudden-onset events and slow-onset changes in environmental
conditions.20 Sudden-onset events are those that emerge over short
periods of time, such as tornadoes, earthquakes, hurricanes, floods,
tsunamis, wildfires and extreme wind, rain or snow events. In some
instances, they occur with little or no warning, such as tornadoes or
earthquakes; in others, communities at risk may get advance warning
of an event such as a flood, storm or hurricane. Such events are
characterized by the potential for considerable damage to
infrastructure, property and carry with them the risk of loss of life.
The duration and geographical scale of such events varies from brief
and localized (e.g. tornadoes), to the many days and vast regions
across which the effects of a single hurricane may be felt. A given
type of sudden-onset event is often associated with particular
locations, such as floods with river valleys and hurricanes with the
U.S. Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico coasts. Some events may occur
centuries apart, such as earthquakes along a given geological fault,
while others such as tornadoes and hurricanes occur every year, and
the only uncertainties relate to their specific numbers, paths, and
magnitudes.
20. This distinction between sudden-onset events and slower-onset conditions
traces back several decades of research in natural hazards to authors such as IAN
BURTON ET AL., THE ENVIRONMENT AS HAZARD 23(1978).
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Sudden-onset events are therefore often associated with distress
migration, where those exposed may attempt to flee before the event
occurs, or may be obliged to evacuate after the event due to the
damages that result. Conversely, population movements are typically
not among the initial responses to slow-onset conditions, such as
droughts, land degradation or oscillations in precipitation patterns,
which may emerge over the course of years, last for extended periods
of time, and influence vast regions. Because climatic conditions are
inherently variable both intra- and inter-annually, it may be some
time before human populations recognize the full severity of the
event. For example, fluctuations in precipitation from one year to the
next are common in many agricultural regions, and farm operators
typically develop a range of strategies to minimize the impacts of
such variability on farm incomes. This capacity to adapt to climatic
variability is finite, and when precipitation deviates from the
expected range for multiple successive years, response options may
become exhausted. It is at that point where migration, such as that on
the Great Plains during the 1930s, becomes a preferred adaptation
response.
Both sudden-onset events and slower-onset changes in conditions
are expected to increase in frequency in coming decades. Table 1
provides a brief summary of the most likely exacerbations of existing
climatic conditions and events identified by the IPCC. These do not
include phenomena such as rapid increases in mean sea levels and
changes in ocean circulation patterns, which have also been identified
as potential risks associated with climate change. 2 1 Much of the
uncertainty about the likelihood of these latter events occurring
and/or their rate of onset is due to our inability to forecast future
levels of greenhouse gas emissions and uncertainty as to how Earth
systems will respond to elevated atmospheric concentrations of
greenhouse gases. There is no reason to expect that earth systems
will react to anthropogenic modification of the atmosphere in a
predictable fashion or that changes will be incremental in nature. On
the contrary, changes may occur in a non-linear fashion, and so we
must accept the very real potential for climate "surprise", a situation
where past knowledge and understanding of earth systems behavior,
21. RICHARD B. ALLEY ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL
SCIENCE BASIS 5 (S. Solomon et al. eds., 2007).
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and consequently the impacts on human well-being, are no longer
applicable.22
Table 1: Expected impacts of anthropogenic climate change 23
Expected change Regions to be affected
Increases in annual average river runoff High latitudes and some
and water availability wet tropical areas
Decreases in annual average river runoff Mid-latitudes and dry
and water availability tropics
Increased extent of areas affected by Regions already
droughts susceptible to drought
More intense precipitation events Will vary by region
Reduce water availability in regions South Asia, China,
dependent on Mountain snowmelt western North America,
western South America
Increasing number of plant and animal Globally
species at risk of extinction; increased
potential for significant ecosystem
disturbances
Decreasing crop productivity; more Lower latitudes, dry
frequent impacts of drought and floods tropics, seasonally dry
on crop production regions
Increased risk of erosion; millions more Coastal regions,
people exposed to flooding and extreme especially those already
storms exposed to such risks
The Dust Bowl migration and migration responses to Hurricane
Katrina are only two of many examples of environment-related
population movements in living memory. One of the more familiar
examples from abroad is the case of Bangladesh, where floods and
storms in recent decades have displaced hundreds of thousands per
event. 24 Another is that of Hurricane Mitch, which in 1998 led to the
displacement of hundreds of thousands of Hondurans from their
22. D. G. Streets & M. H. Glantz, Exploring the Concept of Climate Surprise,
10 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 97, 97 (2000).
23. ADGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 11-12.
24. See generally Rafael Reuveny, Ecomigration and Violent Conflict: Case
Studies and Public Policy Implications, 36 HUM. ECOLOGY 1, 5 (2008) (noting that
"1 2 to 17 million Bangladeshis have migrated to India" since the 1950s).
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homes. 25 Many migrated to neighboring countries, and the United
States Immigration and Naturalization Service (as it was then known)
created a special program for those unable to return to Honduras, a
program that has since remained in effect. In China in 1998, floods
along the Yangtze River displaced an estimated 14 million people; it
is not known how many of that group returned to their homes and
how many migrated away from the flood-affected region.2 6 Several
countries in East Africa have experienced drought-related population
displacements from semi-arid rural areas in recent decades (one is
occurring in Kenya at the time of this writing in 2009), while in
Sudano-Sahelian West Africa rural populations have adopted an
institutionalized, circular pattern of seasonal intra-regional migration,
something Rain describes more vividly as "eating the dry season".
27
These and other known environment-related migrations pale
considerably in comparison with the estimates being made for future
environmental migration, which are heavily influenced by worries
about the implications of climate change. One popular estimate
suggested by British ecologist Norman Myers, projects there may be
200 million 'environmental refugees' worldwide by the end of the
21st century. 28 On the UN Day for Disaster Reduction in 2005, the
United Nations University's Institute for Environment and Human
Security issued a press release that predicted 50 million
25. Saul S. Morris et al., Hurricane Mitch and the Livelihoods of the Rural Poor
in Honduras, 30 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 49, 53 (2002).
26. Great Wall Across the Yangtze,
http://www.pbs.org/itvs/greatwall/daml.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
27. For examples of related research, see DAVID RAIN, EATERS OF THE DRY
SEASON: CIRCULAR LABOR MIGRATION IN THE WEST AFRICAN SAHEL (Westview
Press 1999); Oli Brown et al., Climate Change as the 'New' Security Threat:
Implications for Africa, 83 INT'L AFF. 1141, 1150 (2007); C. H. D. Magadza,
Climate Change Impacts and Human Settlements in Africa: Prospects for
Adaptation, 61 ENVTL. MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT 193, 193-205 (2000); A.
Adugna, The 1984 Drought and Settler Migration in Ethiopia, in POPULATION AND
DISASTER 114-127 (J. I. Clarke et al. eds., 1989); Bernt Lindtjom et al., Population
Growth, Fertility, Mortality and Migration in Drought Prone Areas in Ethiopia, 87
TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOC'Y FOR TROPICAL MED. AND HYGIENE 24, 24-28
(1993).
28. Myers, supra note 4, at 609. Note that in this article I make no attempt to
distinguish 'environmental refugees' or similar terms from the more general terms
environmental migrants/migration; other authors in this volume of FELR will
tackle such themes in detail.
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environmental refugees by 2010.29 The relief organization Christian
Aid suggests there could be as many as 1 billion people displaced
from their homes by 2050 as a consequence of environmental
change. 30 To put such figures into context, at the end of 2008, the
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated
there were 11.4 million refugees worldwide, 31 and another 26 million
involuntarily displaced within their own borders. 32 Meanwhile, the
Population Division of the UN's Department of Economic and Social
Affairs estimates the world's total migrant population at any given
time numbers about 200 million people (Figure 3).33
Figure 3: Comparison of environmental refugee predictions with
current global refugee and migration levels
34
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29. Press Release, United Nations University, As Ranks of "Environmental
Refugees" Swell Worldwide, Calls Grow for Better Definition, Recognition,
Support (Oct. 11, 2005).
30. CHRISTIAN AID, supra note 4, at 5.
31. UNHCR, Global Appeal 2009 (Update): Populations of Concern to UNHCR
110 (Dec. 1 2008), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4922d43a0.html.
32. UNHCR.org, Internally Displaced People Figures,
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c23.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2009).
33. See U.N. Dep't Econ. & Soc. Pol'y, Population Div., International
Migration Report 2006: A Global Assessment, at xiv (2009) available at
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/2006_MigrationRep/ report.htm.
34. UNHCR, supra note 31, UNHCR.org, supra note 32 (combined figures
represent current UNHCR forced migrants); United Nations University, supra note
29 (UNU-EHS 2010 forecast); U.N. Dep't Econ. & Soc. Pol'y, supra note 33
(current world migrants); Myers, supra note 4 (Myers <2100 forecast); CHRISTIAN
AID, supra note 4, at 5 (Christian Aid 2050 forecast).
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IV. WHY POPULATIONS ARE EXPOSED TO HAZARDOUS
ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS
It may be asked why is it in the first place that large human
populations are often found in areas where environmental hazards are
common. The simplest answer reflects the historical trajectory of
human development: it is because such areas are often very well-
suited for human livelihood activities. For example, it is no accident
that many of America's largest urban centers developed in river
valleys, deltas and coastal estuaries. In the years following European
settlement of the Americas, such locations provided reliable supplies
of drinkable water, moving water (a critical energy source in the pre-
fossil fuel era), access to agricultural land and the ability to ship
commercial goods by boat. The Mississippi River system was a key
factor in the development and expansion of the American economy
into the interior, but as with many coastal and riverine settlements a
considerable investment eventually had to be made (and continues to
be made) to protect the communities along its banks from
catastrophic flooding.
The same logic applies on other continents as well. An estimated
ten percent of the world's population, and fifteen percent of the
world's urban population, lives within ten meters of sea level.35
Relatively large human population densities have existed in the deltas
of the large rivers of Africa and Asia since antiquity, notwithstanding
the proneness of such regions to periodic flooding. Indeed, it often
precisely because of seasonal floods-which leave behind large
deposits of organic material and nutrients-that deltaic soils
remained fertile despite intensive agricultural development and thus
capable of supporting ever-growing populations. These densely
populated deltaic regions-the Nile, the Indus, the Ganges, the
Irrawaddy, the Yellow, among others-are now regularly cited in the
climate science literature as being particularly exposed to the risks of
rising sea levels and extreme storm events.
36
35. Gordon McGranahan et al., The Rising Tide: Assessing the Risks of Climate
Change and Human Settlements in Low Elevation Coastal Zones, 19 ENV'T AND
URBANIZATION 17, 17 (2007).
36. See generally ADGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 12, 16; M. El-Raey et al.,
Adaptations to the Impacts of Sea Level Rise in Egypt, 12 CLIMATE RES. 117, 117-
128 (1999); M. Monirul Qader Mirza et al., The Implications of Climate Change on
2009]
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These pre-existing environmental risks are further complicated by
high rates of rural-to-urban migration and rapid urbanization in
developing regions over the last half-century, which increase the
number of people at risk. Technological progress holds the
possibility of reducing the vulnerability of urban populations, but
access to it at a global level is typically uneven. Wealthier nations
are able to construct increasingly elaborate infrastructure to protect
coastal and riverine populations from flood events and storm surges.
Most readers will be familiar with the case of the Netherlands and the
series of sea walls that have allowed the reclamation of land from the
sea and protect the country's low-lying areas from floods, and with
that of Venice, where a multi-billion dollar project is being
undertaken to build dams that will regulate water levels in its famous
lagoon. Perhaps less well-known in North America is that London
and surrounding regions are protected from extreme high tides and
flooding by a control structure known as the Thames Barrier.37 The
expected lifespan of the Barrier, completed in the early 1980s, is
shortening as the rate of sea level rise accelerates, and British
authorities have begun planning for its successor. Engineering works
such as the Barrier need constant investment and upgrading and are
often well beyond the financial means of developing countries. This
skews the likelihood of future environmental migration to being most
likely to emerge from developing-nation populations residing in low
lying coastal areas and on small island states cannot afford the
infrastructure that might protect them from the consequences of
anthropogenic climate change.
38
Technological progress of recent decades has also helped
overcome many of the original preconditions that once influenced
where cities could be located and enabled population growth in areas
less attractive to past generations. Twentieth-century population
growth in the Sun-Belt states accompanied the expansion of
Floods of the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna Rivers in Bangladesh, 57
CLIMATIC CHANGE 287, 287-318 (2003); see McGranahan et al., supra note 35.
37. See generally Environment Agency, The Thames Barrier,
http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/homeandleisure/floods/38353.aspx (last
visited Nov. 09, 2009)
38. This seems a particularly inequitable outcome given that developing world
populations experience few of the economic benefits of rampant fossil fuel
consumption, which might otherwise provide them the financial wherewithal to
invest in protective infrastructure.
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America's service-based economy, the advent of cheap air-
conditioning, and widespread automobile ownership. New cultural
preferences also emerged to create growing interest in living in places
like Las Vegas, Miami, Phoenix and Raleigh. Population growth in
such areas exposes ever more people to urban drought and
hurricanes, while in southern California the building of homes in the
dry hills around Los Angeles exposes greater amounts of people and
property to wildfires.
The combined trends in human population growth, affluence and
technological development of the past half-century have influenced
the relationship between environment and human migration in three
general ways. First, across the globe high rates of population growth
and rural-to-urban migration continually raise the potential for
environmentally-related population displacements and the size of
such displacements, especially in developing regions. Second, in
many regions human settlements are expanding into new areas where
environmental hazards are present, raising the potential for future
distress migration events. Third, anthropogenic climate change is
exacerbating existing environmental risks and creates new ones for
many of the world's most densely populated areas. The effects of
these broad-based, large-scale trends on particular environmental
migration outcomes at community, household and individual levels
are the preoccupation of the remainder of this article.
V. CAPITAL AND ITS INFLUENCE ON HOUSEHOLD ADAPTATION
AND MIGRATION
Households and individuals within any given population possess a
wide and variable range of capacity to adapt to or cope with
environmental stresses. When governments are unable to protect
their residents from the impacts of adverse environmental conditions
or provide relief after the fact, it falls to community groups or
individual households to somehow adapt. The range of adaptive
options varies from one household to the next, depending on the age,
health, education, work skills, financial assets and other attributes of
the household. Migration away from the affected area, on either a
39. W. Neil Adger et al., Adaptation to Climate Change in the Developing
World, 3 PROGRESS iN DEV. STUD. 179, 186, 192 (2003).
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temporary or indefinite basis, is one of any number of adaptive
options that may emerge.
The adaptive capacity of households and the response options they
choose can be understood in terms of the capital available to
households. 40  In this context, capital is not limited solely to
economic capital (that is, money and assets readily convertible to
money), but also social capital and human capital. Each household
has its own particular mix of capital assets. Certain combinations of
capital enable particular choices of adaptation, and deficiencies in
critical types of capital may serve as impediments to adaptation,
depending on the environmental conditions being experienced. The
interactions of capital and migration can be illustrated with examples
from drought migrations in the U.S. during the 1930s.
4i
Economic capital can be held in various forms, including cash
money, financial instruments, real property and fixed assets such as
automobiles, machinery and so forth. In rural societies, economic
capital may also include livestock, draft animals and various farming
technologies. It is inevitably distributed on an uneven basis in
capitalist economies, and is a key factor in creating class distinctions
within them. Some types of economic capital are portable or
transferable across distances, particularly money and vehicles, and
serve to facilitate mobility and migration. Others, such as real
property and machinery or equipment, are less portable, and during
times of crisis it may not be easy to convert these to money at a
reasonable value. These latter types of economic capital therefore
tend to give their owners a significant disincentive to migrate from an
area under environmental stress, or encourage them to return to an
area after distress migration has occurred. During the 1930s,
migrants out of the Great Plains were disproportionately drawn from
that region's large population of tenant farmers, who might best be
described as the rural middle class. They tended to possess farm
equipment, automobiles and small amounts of cash savings, but did
not own title to the farms they operated. When droughts struck and
40. For greater review of capital in migration, see McLeman et al., supra note
16.
41. See generally Robert A. McLeman, Household Access to Capital and Its
Influence on Climate-Related Rural Population Change: Lessons from the Dust
Bowl Years, in FARMING IN A CHANGING CLIMATE: AGRICULTURAL ADAPTATION
IN CANADA (Ellen Wall et al. eds, 2007); as well as McLeman, supra note 12, R.
McLeman & B. Smit, supra note 2 at 41-45; and Brown et al., supra note 27.
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crops failed, tenant farmers in large numbers were obliged to leave
their homes and seek out new residences, creating a large population
predisposed to migration and with the means to travel over long
distances.
Social capital-that is, social networks and relationships that work
to provide benefits to their members-play a critical role in
adaptation to environmental stress, and can have a significant
influence on migration outcomes. Social capital is found in families,
in formal organizations such as churches and service clubs, and in
informal groups and organizations such as people who share common
interests, livelihoods or leisure activities. Residents of communities
where local social networks are strong tend to lose fewer members of
their population during stressful environmental conditions than do
communities where social capital is lacking. Common first-order
responses to 1930s droughts were for extended families to pool
resources and share accommodations, and for merchants to accept
barter or extend credit to families who were known to them. For
many families, mobilization of social capital in these and other ways
was sufficient to see them through the droughts until favorable
conditions returned. On the other hand, those who lacked large
extended families (especially the elderly and single parent
households) and families who were not well-known within their
communities were often left to fend on their own, and experienced
disproportionate levels of hardship. Squatter settlements of the type
we associate today with third-world refugee camps developed on the
outskirts of many Great Plains towns and cities during the 1930s,
filled with members of the rural poor.
Where social networks exist across long distances, the social
capital that arises can facilitate migration out of areas experiencing
environmental stress. To undertake migration and resettlement, even
on a temporary basis, entails considerable costs that can be offset
through access to social capital.42 By drawing on assistance from
relatives, former community members or contacts in another place, a
potential migrant can take advantage of three key benefits. The first
42. See generally Alberto Palloni et al., Social Capital and International
Migration: A Test Using Information on Family Networks, 106 AM. J. Soc. 1262
(2001); Douglas S. Massey, & Kristin E. Espinosa, What's Driving Mexico-US
Migration? A Theoretical, Empirical and Policy Analysis, 102 AM. J. Soc. 939
(1997).
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is the possibility of direct assistance in undertaking the journey in the
form of transportation, financial assistance, and/or valuable
information about the journey and the destination. The second is
settlement assistance, such as finding a place to stay and
introductions to potential employers in the destination area. The third
is insulation or protection from hostility that migrants often face
when they arrive in new places, particularly when they are seen as
being undesirable by the receiving community. Those who migrated
from the Great Plains to California during the 1930s typically drew
upon the assistance of friends and relatives who had migrated there
before them, and tended to settle in particular areas on arrival, such as
the Bell Gardens suburb of Los Angeles or in the many "Okie-towns"
that sprang up in the San Joaquin and Imperial valleys. Californian
communities were often openly hostile to the newcomers and
attempted to limit their access to public services. In 1936, when
arrivals from the Great Plains were particularly high, the Los Angeles
County sheriffs department went so far as to operate a blatantly
unconstitutional "blockade" of highways entering California,
conducting illegal searches and harassment of out-of-state vehicles
whose occupants fit the profile of drought migrants. 1930s migrants
formed tightly knit communities in California that are readily
identifiable to this date, and which enabled them to not only cope
with the hostility they faced, but to eventually gain greater
representation in the formal institutions of these communities.
Cultural capital comprises the third broad category of capital that
influences household adaptation strategies during times of
environmental stress.43 This category consists of what is often
referred to as human capital (i.e. work-related skills, formal or
informal education and training), along with other attributes
including health and physical well-being, language skills, and cultural
norms and practices. Such attributes are inherently variable within
communities and even within families, from one individual to
another. Although often difficult to measure empirically, they have a
considerable influence on adaptive capacity at the household level,
and sudden changes can have considerable impacts on well-being.
For example, in agricultural households, where the ability to perform
43. See Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, in HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND
RESEARCH FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 47(J. E. Richardson ed., Richard
Nice trans., 1986).
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physical labor is a critical factor in farm success, an injury, sudden
illness or death of an adult can tip that family from a position of
having food and financial security to one of indebtedness,
vulnerability and/or suddenly being displaced from its home.
Cultural capital is often influenced by macro-economic forces
operating well beyond the community level. For example,
agricultural populations typically develop particular skills and
aptitudes associated with favored types of crop or livestock
production. In Oklahoma in the 1930s, many farmers specialized in
growing cotton, a crop where production had not yet been
mechanized and consequently required the producer to learn a range
of specialized skills such as working with draft animals, develop the
manual dexterity to remove ripe cotton fibers from prickly bolls, and
so forth. The scale and duration of the 1930s droughts meant that
cotton farmers who lost their own crops were unable to find wage
labor on other farms in the region, which were also experiencing crop
losses due to droughts. The concurrent economic conditions of the
Great Depression meant that other forms of off-farm employment-
then and now a common farm-family adaptation to stress and
economic uncertainty-were not available in the drought-affected
region. In other words, the skills of the rural middle class were
devalued within the region. At the same time, 1930s federal
immigration policies closed the U.S. border to seasonal farm laborers
from Mexico, creating an agricultural labor shortage in California
that would help draw thousands of Great Plains families westward.
It is the interaction of these various forms of capital and the
differential access to them within communities that shape the
adaptation and migration outcomes witnessed during adverse
environmental conditions. This logic applies as well to recovery
from catastrophic events after they occur, such as the differential
rates of recovery from Katrina among various neighborhoods and
social classes in New Orleans. For example, Airriess et al. have
demonstrated that social capital has played a significant role in the
recovery of that city's small, relatively impoverished Vietnamese
community, which prior to Katrina had been concentrated in
neighborhoods in the least desirable parts of the city near a large
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landfill site. 44  By drawing upon a nation-wide community of
expatriate Vietnamese to place political pressure on Congress and
channeling the networking abilities of Vietnamese Catholic Church
congregations, this group was able to mobilize considerable resources
and accelerate the rebuilding of their community.
It is also important to recognize that migration is typically not the
first-order adaptive response of households in response to
environmental stresses, and populations are often inherently
predisposed toward rebuilding their communities after a sudden-onset
event. Social networks and cultural capital are historically
contingent-that is, they take time to form and develop-and so the
abandonment of one's place of residence also results in the
abandonment of these reservoirs of capital. Where the household's
economic capital is bound up in real property or other assets that are
not readily transferable, a decision to migrate or to not return after a
catastrophic event is often a last-resort response. For example, when
drought conditions emerge, a rural household might adapt by seeking
off-farm employment, by changing its selection of crops or animals
to use less water, or any number of other possible strategies. 45 If the
usual range of adaptive strategies is inadequate and the drought
becomes prolonged or especially severe, the household may then
consider potential migration options. The preferred migration option
might be temporary and local, such as sending some family members
to live with relatives outside the drought-stricken area. The
migration might also be permanent and lead the household to cross
long distances to seek employment. The severity and duration of the
drought, the perceived benefits of relocating versus staying, the
geographic extent of a family's social networks, its financial means,
its health and well-being will interact to shape the household's
migration decision and destination. Such were the processes that
unfolded on the Great Plains, and they continue to unfold in similar
ways in other parts of the world today.
44. Christoper A. Airriess et al., Church-Based Social Capital, Networks and
Geographical Scale: Katrina Evacuation, Relocation, and Recovery in a New
Orleans Vietnamese American Community, 39 GEOFORUM 1333, 1342-43 (2007).
45. Barry Smit & Mark W. Skinner, Adaptation Options in Agriculture to
Climate Change: A Typology. 7 MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR
GLOBAL CHANGE 85, 101,103 (2002).
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VI. WORST-CASE SCENARIOS AND MIGRATION
To this point, discussion has focused primarily on other-than-
worst-case scenarios; that is, situations where adaptation and
migration decisions are made at the household or community level in
response to observed and known environmental risks after the
hazardous event occurs. There are past examples where state and
federal governments have proactively offered incentives to
households to relocate out of areas prone to repeated occurrences of
environmental hazards. In the 1930s, the government of Alberta,
Canada, offered residents of drought-stricken farms in southeastern
parts of the province free railway freight to move their possessions if
they agreed to relocate to farms in the wetter, more temperate
northwest of the province.46  In the past decade the British
government has been actively involved in the relocation of residents
of the island of Montserrat, a Caribbean island dependency of Britain
where volcanic activity has made the island uninhabitable for long
periods of time.47 At the time of writing in March 2009, the Red
River that flows through the U.S. states of North Dakota and
Minnesota, and the Canadian province of Manitoba, has swollen to its
highest recorded spring water levels since European settlement of the
region. Many communities along the river have been evacuated and
temporary dikes are being built to protect densely populated areas
along the floodplain. After the last major flood in 1997 many
communities decided to remove homes from the most flood-prone
areas and, in the case of Manitoba, to invest in the expansion of a
floodway that diverts excess flows away from cities and towns. This
combination of deliberately removing people from areas at risk,
investing in infrastructure, and mobilizing emergency efforts appears
to be paying off in terms of minimizing property damage and loss of
life.
Examples such as these of proactive population relocations
undertaken by governments in response to environmental risks are
not especially common, are typically initiated on an ad hoc basis in
response to particular environmental events or conditions, and are
46. Gregory P. Marchildon et al., Drought and Institutional Adaptation in the
Great Plains of Alberta and Saskatchewan, 1914-1939, 45 NATURAL HAzARDS
391 (2008).
47. Richard Stone, Bracing for the Big One on Montserrat, 299 SCIENCE 2027,
2028 (2003).
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done on an intra-jurisdictional basis. There are exceedingly few
examples where two or more states have collaborated on a deliberate
policy or program of resettling across international borders
populations facing environmental risks. However, the risks
associated with anthropogenic climate change suggest that such
initiatives may increasingly become necessary. The most obvious
and most likely emergence will be the need to relocate coastal and
small island populations due to mean sea level rise, something which
is likely well beyond the capacity of communities and households.
Although a number of opinions have been offered on the need to
develop international arrangements to facilitate such relocations,
there are no existing mechanisms in international law to do so, and
little evidence of any to emerge over the horizon in the near future.48
There currently circulates a myth, popularized by the movie An
Inconvenient Truth, that residents of low-lying Pacific Island states
are migrating in large numbers because of sea level rise to New
Zealand under a special immigration program. Empirical evidence
has shown that no such migration is occurring, and that islanders such
as those on Funafuti in Tuvalu are actually quite resistant to leaving
their country for New Zealand except for more traditional reasons of
reunification with family members. 49 That said, planned relocations
of small island populations may well become unavoidable within a
decade or so, regardless of the wishes of residents.50
VII.CONCLUSION
The FELR's Symposium, Global Responses to Eco-Migration and
Environmental Disasters: The Role of U.S. and International Law and
Policy, placed much needed attention on issues that are bound to
challenge the international policy-making community and the legal
community for years to come. Anthropogenic climate change, land
degradation and resource depletion are together increasing the
likelihood that environmental migration will increase in frequency
and magnitude in coming years. It is already well-established that
48. For greater review on international law and environmental migration, see
McLeman, supra note 4.
49. Colette Mortreux & Jon Barnett, Climate Change, Migration and
Adaptation in Funafuti, Tuvalu, 19 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 105 (2009).
50. Jon Barnett, & W. Neil Adger, Climate Dangers and Atoll Countries, 61
CLIMATIC CHANGE 321, 326 (2003).
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environmental conditions in various forms can have significant
impacts on human migration patterns. It is also well-established that
current international legal structures related to migration are not
designed to address existing challenges related to environmental
migration, let alone increased future ones. Households and
individuals in many regions today undertake migration decisions that
have been heavily influenced by the interaction of environmental
stresses with macro-level socio-economic and technological changes,
and the migration outcomes are ultimately decided by the range of
options available to them given their particular access to capital.
They will continue to do so whether or not the international policy-
making and legal community makes progress in establishing
appropriate and effective institutional and legal frameworks. From a
public policy and human rights point of view, it is obviously
preferable that such frameworks be developed sooner rather than
later, and it is hoped that emerging legal scholars direct their energies
and attention toward this challenge.
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